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Justice O'Connor Replaces Justice
Stewart: What Effect On
Constitutional Cases?
CHARLES D. KELSO*
Potter Stewart, a Republican from Ohio, was appointed to the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1958 by President Eisenhower.
By the time of his retirement in 1981, Justice Stewart had served
through the Warren years and the first decade of the Burger era.' Pres-
ident Reagan appointed Sandra Day O'Connor to fill the vacancy. A
Republican from Arizona, she served in its legislature and on its Court
of Appeals. Lawyers who follow decisions of the Court are asking
what difference her appointment will make in constitutional cases.
The question can be approached by studying the most recent term of
the Court. From the pattern of votes, particularly how Justice Stewart
stood in the 5-4 decisions, some inferences can be drawn. Another ap-
proach is to look back at 5-4 decisions in previous years where Justice
Stewart's vote with the majority was crucial to the outcome. Both ap-
proaches will be explored in this article.
During its 1980-81 term, the Supreme Court decided and wrote opin-
ions in 70 cases where constitutional issues were presented. The pat-
tern of votes was as follows:
* J.D., 1950 University of Chicago; LL.M. 1962 Columbia University; LL.D., 1966 John
Marshall Law School: J.S.D., 1968 Columbia University. Law Clerk to Mr. Justice Minton, 1950-
51; Former Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Miami, 1966-68; Professor of Law
Indiana University; Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
1. On the occasion of Justice Stewart's retirement July 2, 1981, the Chief Justice said of him
that "[Jiustice Stewart has sought constantly to maintain a balanced view of the judiciary as one
limited by precedent and tradition as well as by the Constitution itself. He has sought to preserve
appropriate boundaries consistent with the constitutional duties placed on the judiciary by article
III. His opinions particularly reflect his strong views on guarantees of individual liberty and free-
dom of expression and those views make up a substantial body of our jurisprudence of the past
two decades. - U.S. -, 101 S. CL cccxcII (1981).
Pacfc Law Journal / PoZ. 13
Votes Number of Cases
9-0 16
8-1 9
7-2 12
6-3 21
5-4 12
Total: 702
With respect to the issues involved in 9-0 and 8-1 decisions, one new
Justice will not alter either case results or the general direction of the
Court's thinking. Such decisions represent a consensus on fundamental
principles and their application. Before exploring the divided areas
where the vote or views of a single new Justice could make a difference,
here is a brief look at constitutional areas where the Court is in unani-
mous or near-unanimous agreement.
The Burger Court usually does not exercise its jurisdiction to decide
a constitutional question unless the record clearly presents the issue,
and the Court does not exercise federal jurisdiction when an adequate
state remedy is available In matters of federalism, the Court has been
according great deference to Congressional legislation. Social and eco-
nomic enactments that do not employ a suspect classification or im-
pinge on fundamental rights will be upheld when the legislative means
are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.4 The lim-
its on federal power noted in National League of Cities5 are relevant
2. In a few of the cases, not all of the Justices participated. In this tabulation, a Justice who
did not participate has been counted with the majority. For example, in Minnesota v. Clo per Leaf
Creamery Company, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981), counted as 7-2, the vote was actually 6-1-2
because Justice Rehnquist did not participate.
3. For example, in Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2211(1981), the Court first granted and then dismissed a writ of certiorari in a case challenging the
constitutionality of an affirmative action program in California prisons. The Court said there
were significant ambiguities in the record concerning the extent to which race or sex had been
used for promotions and the justifications for such use. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1223. Justice
Stewart, dissenting, said he would reverse the California Court because it had wrongly held that
the state may consider a person's race in making promotion decisions. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. 2223.
See also Webb v. Webb, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1889, 1892 (1981) where despite references to
"full faith and credit" in the record below, the Supreme Court was unable to conclude that peti-
tioner had raised a federal claim. Parratt v. Taylor, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981) dealt with
the adequacy of state remedies. There a prisoner had been deprived of his property, a hobby kit,
by negligence of prison officials. The Court held that this deprivation fell within the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1913. State tort claims procedures, however, satisfied the
requirements of procedural due process. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1917. Justice Stewart, concurring,
said that this kind of loss was not a deprivation within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
Id. He agreed, however, that Nebraska had done all that the fourteenth amendment requires. Id.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, said there was not an adequate state remedy because prison officials
did not say they had informed the prisoner about his rights under state law. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at
1923.
4. Hodel v. Indiana, - U.S. -, - 101 S. Ct. 2376, 2386 (1981) (upholding the Surface
Mining and Reclamation Control Act of 1977).
5. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (tenth amendment bars applica-
tion of federal wage and hour laws to state and local employees).
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only for regulations that apply to the states as states.6 Further, the
Court rather readily finds that state law conflicts with federal law or
policy and, thus, that the state law must give away.7
Again, deference describes the posture of the Court in its 1980-81
separation of powers decision concerning Presidential action with re-
spect to the claims of American citizens against Iran.' Those claims
could be suspended and the claimants required to pursue them only
through binding arbitration in an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
Over Justice Powell's dissent,9 the Court said, 8 to 1, that this was not a
taking which required just compensation. The Court was less deferen-
tial to Congress, however, with respect to the time at which salary in-
creases for federal judges became vested.' 0
Most of the constitutional decisions in 1980-81, as usual, were in the
realm of individual rights. The Court protected individual rights 9-0 or
8-1 against claimed governmental interests by extending the Miranda
doctrine to sentencing"l and by predictably applying the fifth amend-
ment's guarantee against self-incrimination,12 due process protections
for indigent defendants,13 the equal protection clause,' 4 and the free
exercise of religion clause.' 5 On the other hand, the Court found gov-
6. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct.
2352 (1981), the Court held that the United States could regulate surface mining of coal because
that activity so affects interstate commerce as to make its regulation an appropriate means to the
attainment of a legislative end. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2363. Distinguishing NationalLeague, and
thereby emphasizing its limits, Justice Marshall said that the federal act did not apply to the states
asstates, id. at--, 101 S. Ct. at 2366; did not address matters that were indisputably attributes of
state sovereignty, id; and did not directly require a state to restructure its operations in areas of
traditional functions, id.
7. See Maryland v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2114, 2128-130 (1981) (Louisiana's
"first use" tax held to interfere with Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's authority to deter-
mine pipeline and production costs).
8. Dames & Moore v. Regan, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
9. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2992.
10. United States v. Will, - U.S. -- -- 101 S. Ct. 471, 487 (1981) (Congress can repeal an
announced intention to increase the salary of federal judges but cannot lower judicial salaries
once an increase becomes due and payable).
11. See Estelle v. Smith, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981) (defendant must be advised that
anything he says to a psychiatrist can be used against him in a sentence proceeding, id. at -, 101
S. Ct. at 1875, and sixth amendment right to counsel is violated if defense counsel is not advised in
advance that a psychiatric examination would encompass the issue of future dangerousness), id. at
-, 101 S. Ct. at 1876; Edwards v. Arizona, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884 (1981) (after
counsel is requested, the police may not re-interrogate unless the accused has initiated further
communications and has made a valid waiver of counsel).
12. See Carter v. Kentucky, - U.S. -, - 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1121 (1981) (a defendant who
does not testify is entitled to an instruction that no inference of guilt should be drawn from that
fact).
13. See Little v. Streater, - U.S. -, -- 101 S. Ct. 2202, 2211 (1981) (on request of an
indigent defendant in a paternity proceeding the state must pay for blood tests of the mother).
14. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1195, 1199 (1981) (a statute granting
a husband power to dispose of property owned jointly with his wife denies equal protection).
15. See Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security, - U.S. -, -' 101 S. Ct.
1425, 1432 (1981) (a state may not refuse to pay unemployment benefits to a worker who quit
because for religious reasons he could not work on tanks).
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emmental interests sufficient to overcome claimed individual rights
when it extended the scope of warrantless searches in several circum-
stances,' 6 permitted TV experimentation at trials over defendant's ob-
jections,' 7 allowed double-ceiling of prisoners,'8 consecutive sentences
for marijuana importing and distributing,' 9 and retroactive application
of changes in the income tax."° Similarly, it unanimously held that the
right to travel is not violated by a statute which penalizes a parent who
abandons a child and leaves the state.2 ' It also held 9-0 that dismissing
an indictment is not the proper remedy for breach of fourth or fifth
amendment rights nor of the sixth amendment right to counsel.22
An examination of majority opinions and dissents in the Court's 7-2
and 6-3 cases decided in 1980-81 will reveal, as in previous years, that
there are consistently divergent patterns of voting behavior. On the
basis of these patterns, liberal and conservative positions can be sketch-
ed out on various constitutional issues.
At one extreme of constitutional doctrine are Justices Brennan and
Marshall. In the 54 constitutional cases where the Court was not unan-
imous, Justice Marshall dissented 29 times. Justice Brennan was the
second most frequent dissenter, casting 26 votes against the majority.
Table I provides additional details on the frequency of dissents by vari-
ous Justices.
16. See United States v. Cortez, - U.S. 1-, -, 01 S. Ct. 690, 697 (1981) (border patrol
officers could stop a car where they had an objective basis for suspecting that the driver was
transporting illegal aliens) id.; Donovan v. Dewey, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 2541 (1981)
(mine inspectors can conduct warrantless searches of commercial property for safety violations).
17. See Chandler v. Florida, - U.S.-,-, 101 S. Ct. 802, 814 (1981) (states may experiment
with TV in the courtroom if there are guidelines with respect to unobtrusiveness of equipment and
defendant has pretrial opportunities to make objections).
18. See Rhodes v. Chapman, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2399 (1981) (double-ceiling of
prisoners is not per se cruel and unusual punishment).
19. See Albernaz v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 1145 (1981) (the double
jeopardy clause is not violated by consecutive sentences for importing and for distributing mari-
juana because each crime requires proof of a fact that the other does not).
20. See United States v. Darusmont, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 549, 553 (1981) (a change in
the income tax can be applied to the entire calendar year because taxpayers have reason to know
that such a change might occur).
21. See Jones v. Helms, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 2434, 2439-42 (1981).
22. United States v. Morrison, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 665, 669 (1981) (dismissal of an
indictment is not the proper remedy for breach of fourth or fifth amendment rights nor of the sixth
amendment right to counsel).
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TABLE L DISSENTS IN 70 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CASES IN 1980-81 TERM
Justice Vote Pattern
8/1 7/2 6/3 5/4 Total Dissents
Rehnquist 3 2 9 3 17
Burger 0 1 4 3 8
Powell 1 0 3 3 7
Stewart 2 0 6 4 12
Blackmun 0 1 6 5 12
White 0 2 5 5 12
Stevens 0 6 7 7 20
Brennan 0 5 12 9 26
Marshall 3 6 11 9 29
The groupings of Justices in dissent are even more revealing than are
the total number of dissents. Table II presents the data.
TABLE I1 PAIRINGS IN DISSENT DURING 1980-81
TERM
Rehnquist Burger Powell Stewart Blackmun White Stevens Brennan
Burger 8
Powell 4 3
Stewart 6 4 1
Blackmun 3 1 2 1
White 4 1 1 2 1
Stevens 3 1 2 1 5 4
Brennan 1 0 1 5 5 5 11
Marshall 0 0 1 4 6 7 12 24
Table II shows that Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in dissent
a total of 24 times. In half of those cases they were joined or supported
by Justice Stevens. The judicial positions taken in dissenting opinions
joined by both Brennan and Marshall will be identified herein as
"liberal".
The liberal agenda for the Court, as indicated in dissents written or
joined in by Brennan and Marshall, is that the Court should not be
reluctant to exercise its jurisdiction in cases where individual rights are
at stake and that it should give individual interests great weight when
they are balanced against claims of governmental interest. For exam-
ple, Brennan and Marshall dissented from the denial of certiorari in
each death penalty case considered by the Court. Each time they reaf-
firmed their view that the death penalty is unconstitutional as cruel and
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unusual punishment under all circumstances.23 In another 7-2 deci-
sion, they said that a pretrial suppression hearing on identification evi-
dence should be provided when requested by the defendant whenever
the identification procedures were unduly suggestive.24
At the other constitutional extreme are Justice Rehnquist and Chief
Justice Burger. As Table II shows, Justice Rehnquist did not join Jus-
tice Marshall in a single dissent. He joined Justice Brennan only once.
The Chief Justice did not join either Brennan or Marshall in any dis-
senting opinion or vote. In contrast, he voted with Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting, in eight cases. Again, Justice Powell was in dissent only
once with Brennan, once with Marshall, and only twice with Stevens.
Yet Powell joined Rehnquist four of the seven times that Powell dis-
sented. Positions supported by Justice Rehnquist will be identified
herein as "conservative" when he is joined by Justice Powell or by
Chief Justice Burger.
When Rehnquist or Marshall dissented by themselves, as each did in
three of the 8-1 cases, their views may be regarded as extreme varia-
tions of conservative or liberal themes, respectively.25 Combinations of
Justices who dissented together in more than one case, analyzed in Ta-
bles III, IV, and V, were likely to include both Brennan and Marshall.
26
23. See Quinones v. Texas, 592 S.W. 2d 933 (rex. 1980), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct.
256 (1980).
24. Watkins v. Sowders, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 664, 659-65 (1981).
25. Dissenting alone, Justice Marshall said that double-ceiling was unconstitutional punish-
ment where it did not result from a policy judgment but, rather, from the fact that more people
were sent to a prison than it was designed to hold, Rhodes v. Chapman, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct.
2392, 2410 (1981); that plaintiffs use of the phrase "full faith and credit" was enough to raise a
federal constitutional claim that full faith and credit had been denied, Webb v. Webb, - U.S. -,
-, 101 S. Ct. 1889, 1894 (1981); and that a prisoner should be able to sue in federal courts for an
unconstitutional deprivation of property where state prison officials did not inform plaintiff that a
state procedure was available, Parratt v. Taylor, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 1923 (1981).
Justice Rehnquist, in his three solo dissents, maintained that the Supreme Court should not exer-
cise its original jurisdiction to hear a case brought by Maryland against Louisiana because the
plaintiff's claim was like that of any other consumer and could adequately be handled, initially, by
lower courts, Maryland v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 2114, 2136 (1981); that it was a
violation of the establishment clause to order a state to pay unemployment compensation solely
because of the claimant's religious beliefs, Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec., -
U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1433 (1981); and that the constitutional privilege of self-incrimination
is not denied if the trial court refuses to give an instruction, on defendant's request, that no impli-
cation of guilt should be drawn from defendant's refusal to testify, Carter v. Kentucky, - U.S.-,
-, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1123 (1981).
26. TABLE I. THREE JUSTICE COMBINATIONS WHO DISSENTED MORE
THAN ONCE TOGETHER
Brennan/Marshall/Stevens 3
Brennan/Marshall/White 3
Brennan/Marshall/Blackmun 2
Brennan/Marshall/Stewart 2
Rehnquist/Burger/Stewart 2
TABLE IV. FOUR JUSTICE COMBINATIONS WHO DISSENTED MORE
THAN ONCE TOGETHER
Brennan/Marshall/Stevens/Blackmun 3
Brennan/Marshall/Stevens/White 2
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This and other evidence indicates a strong tendency for the Burger
Court to decide cases in accord with conservative positions. The con-
servative approach to constitutional law is to use federal jurisdiction
sparingly. There is a tendency to let Congress rather than the Court
decide when the states should be prohibited from affecting interstate
commerce. In individual rights cases there is a tendency to work for
practical accommodations of the competing interests.
The contrast between conservative and liberal positions can be expli-
cated by noting the answers given in conservative or liberal opinions to
questions presented in 14 of the constitutional cases that were decided
by a 6-3 vote during the 1980-81 term. Liberal dissents appeared in 9
of the 14 cases. In these cases the majority extended search and seizure
power of the police,27 did not compel voir dire on racial prejudice when
requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime against a person of
a different race,28 approved parental notice requirements in abortion
cases, 29 allowed a street to be closed for the convenience of white resi-
dents where that would inconvenience black residents,3" and found a
rational connection between male-only draft registration and the goal
of drafting persons for combat only.3' Conservative dissents appeared
in five cases. In those cases a majority of the Court (1) was quite defer-
ential to Congressional delegation of broad legislative power in the ec-
onomic realm;32  (2) found that Iowa had not introduced enough
evidence on safety factors to show that its ban on 65 foot double trucks
TABLE V. COMBINATIONS WITH BRENNAN AND MARSHALL DISSENT-
ING IN FIVE-FOUR CASES
In 9 of the 12 cases decided by a 5-4 vote, Brennan and Marshall were in dissent. They
were joined in dissent as follows:
7 times by Stevens
3 times by Blackmun
3 times by White
2 times by Stewart
I time by Powell
27. See Michigan v. Summers, - U.S.-, -, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2589-595 (1981) (a warrant to
search carries with it the implied authority to detain occupants while the premises are searched);
New York v. Belton, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 (1981) (a warrantless search of a car,
incidental to a valid custodial arrest of the driver, can extend to the entire passenger compartment,
including areas that the driver could not reach at the time of the arrest).
28. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1629, 1634-37 (1981).
29. H. L. v. Matheston, - U.S.-,-, I01 S. Ct. 1164, 1170-72 (1981).
30. City of Memphis v. Greene, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1584, 1596-98 (1981).
31. Rostker v. Goldberg, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2651-55 (1981). Liberal dissents
were also handed down in 6-3 holdings that Congress intended to abolish the federal interstate
common law of nuisance when it passed an act to control river pollution. See e.g., City of Mil-
waukee v. Illinois and Michigan, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1800-11 (1981); California v.
Prysock, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 2811-12 (1981); Miranda warnings need not literally
indicate that the accused may have a court appointed attorney before being interrogated by the
police; Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1548-59
(1981) (Congress did not intend to give disabled persons an enforceable bill of rights in the Devel-
opmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 but, rather, merely encouraged
states to do so).
32. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. Inc. v. Donovan, - U.S.-,-, 101 S. Ct. 2478,2492-97
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was other than mere economic protectionism;33 and (3) used the first
amendment to strike down a state ban on outdoor advertising3 4 and a
statute directing that delegates elected at a primary election be seated at
the party's national convention.35
Justice Stewart was not always found in the conservative or liberal
camp. Table II shows that he dissented six times where Rehnquist was
also in dissent. Four times he dissented with Chief Justice Burger. On
the other hand, he was in dissent five times with Justice Brennan and
four times with Justice Marshall. For example, Justice Stewart joined
in liberal positions, dissenting, to reaffirm his views that states cannot
bar the distribution of obscenity between consenting adults, 36 and a
homeowner may not be detained by the police during a search con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant.37
Justice Stewart joined with conservative dissents to say that Congress
did not intend to preempt California's community property laws with
respect to military pensions38 and that Iowa can bar 65 foot double
trucks from its highways in light of the safety evidence adduced by the
state.39 In most of the cases, however, Stewart was in the majority.
Thus, he was opposing the relatively few conservative dissents or was
disagreeing with one of the much more frequent liberal dissents.
Five-to-four cases are, of course, the most critical for assessing the
possible difference in having Justice O'Connor on the Court in place of
Justice Stewart. There were twelve such cases in 1980-81. In nine of
the twelve cases a conservative position prevailed and a liberal position
was asserted in dissent. Stewart voted with the prevailing conservative
majority in holding that:
1) A plaintiff who sues the United States has no right to a jury.40
2) A presumption favoring the right to a court-appointed counsel
exists only when personal freedom is at stake.4'
3) An increase in sentence after an appeal by the United States is
(1981) (Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power when it authorized cotton
dust standards that would protect health "to the extent feasible").
33. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., - U.S. -, - 101 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (1981).
34. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, - U.S. -- , 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2895-97 (1981)
(city ban on all outdoor advertising, except outside commercial ads, with some 12 exceptions, such
as temporary political advertising).
35. Democratic Party v. LaFollette, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1010, 1018-019 (1981).
36. See Wood v. Georgia, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1097, 1105 (1981); Flynt v. Ohio, - U.S.
-, 101 S. Ct. 1958, 1960 (1981). Stewart previously had taken this position with Brennan and
Marshall, dissenting, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73, 112-13 (1973).
37. Michigan v. Summers, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595 (1981).
38. McCarty v. McCarty, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2743 (1981).
39. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1309, 1324-34(1981).
40. Lehman v. Nakshian, - U.S. 1-, -, 01 S. Ct. 2698, 2701-02 (1981).
41. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2158-59 (1981).
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not a violation of the double jeopardy clause.4 2
4) California's statutory rape law does not violate equal protection,
even though it applies only to men.
43
5) Equal protection is not denied by a federal statute which did not
extend monthly comfort allowances to mentally ill persons in
state facilities.z
6) Voting in a water district can be restricted to landowners and
need not follow the one-person one-vote principle.45
7) A state can require a religious organization to limit its sales and
solicitations at a state fair to an assigned location.46
It does not seem likely that Justice O'Connor would have departed
from the conservative position in these cases. Thus, they probably
would have been decided the same way had she been on the Court.
Justice Stewart joined with liberal dissenters in two of the nine cases
decided five-to-four where a conservative view prevailed.47 In both of
these cases the ground for Stewart's dissent was the view he had ex-
pressed, dissenting, in tarisAdult Theatre 1,48 that the first amendment
is violated by a ban on the distribution of obscenity among consenting
adults. Even if Justice O'Connor agreed with this liberal view, which
seems unlikely, it does not have the support of enough Justices to
prevail.
Justice Stewart joined the conservative position, dissenting, in two of
the three cases decided five-to-four where the conservative view did not
prevail. Thus, in California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election
Comm'n .a9 where the majority held that federal election law may place
an annual $5,000 limit on contributions to a multi-candidate political
action committee, Justice Stewart agreed with Justices Rehnquist, Bur-
ger and Powell that the case should have been dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.5 0 The dissent pointed out that an alternative proceeding,
which did not include a direct appeal from the District Court, was al-
ready underway. In a similar vote, Justice Stewart (with Burger and
Blackmun) would have given plenary consideration in Stonte v. Gra-
ham51 to the Kentucky statute which called for posting the Ten Com-
mandments in public schools.5 2 The majority decided, per curiam, that
the statute had no secular purpose and was unconstitutional. That re-
42. United States v. DiFrancesco, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 426, 434-38 (1980).
43. Michael M. v. Superior Court, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1200, 1204-08 (1981).
44. Schweiker v. Wilson, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1081-82 (1981).
45. Ball v. James, - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 1811, 1816-21 (1981).
46. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness Inc., - U.S. 1-, -, 01 S. Ct.
2559, 2563-68 (1981).
47. See note 36 supra.
48. 413 U.S. 49, 73, 112-13 (1973).
49. - U.S. -, -, 101 S. Ct. 2712, 2725 (1981).
50. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2725.
51. - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 192 (1980).
52. Id. at--, 101 S. Ct. at 195.
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suit, said Rehnquist, dissenting, was "cavalier." Whichever way Justice
O'Connor might have voted in these two cases, she could not have
changed the result.
Bullington v. MAissouri5 3 was the only case during the 1980-81 term in
which Justice Stewart, taking a liberal position, formed part of a five
Justice majority against a conservative dissent by four Justices (Rehn-
quist, Burger, Powell and White). In Bullington the court decided that
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, read into the four-
teenth, prohibited the imposition of a harsher sentence after reversal of
a bifurcated sentence proceeding in which the state had the burden of
proving certain factual issues beyond a reasonable doubt. If Justice
O'Connor had been on the bench and had adhered to conservative
views, this case would have been decided the other way and the Court
would have adopted the dissenters' position that the double jeopardy
clause does not apply to sentencing.
It appears, therefore, that Justice O'Connor's vote on cases decided
during the 1980-81 term would have made almost no difference in the
pattern of results. 4 Several areas where her vote in the future might
well produce a significant difference may be perceived by looking back
a few years to several 5-4 cases where Justice Stewart was in the
majority.
In NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,55 Justice Rehnquist (writing for
himself and Justices Burger, Powell and Stewart) said that Congress,
exercising its commerce clause power, may not apply federal wage and
hour laws to state or local employees. The tenth amendment embodies
a policy, Rehnquist said, that prohibits Congress from forcing directly
on the states its choices as to how essential decisions are to be made
regarding the conduct of integral government functions.5 6 Blackmun,
concurring, said that the Court's opinion used a balancing approach. It
did not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protec-
tion, where the federal interest was greater and state facility compliance
with imposed federal standards would be essential.5 7 Brennan, Mar-
shall and White, dissenting, complained that the Court was inventing a
tenth amendment policy to cut back on the scope of the commerce
power in ways that the Court had repudiated in the 1930's.58 Stevens,
53. - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981).
54. It is possible, of course, that she would have voted in a different manner than did Justice
Stewart on petitions for writs of certiorari. Because of the "rule of four," her votes might have
resulted in additional cases being decided or some that were decided not being taken. That line of
inquiry, however, cannot be explored from data available in the reports.
55. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
56. Id. at 852-55.
57. Id. at 856.
58. Id. at 860-63.
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also dissenting, said that he could find no limit on federal power that
would not also restrict clearly permissible areas for federal regulation
of state action. 9 If Justice O'Connor is as perplexed by the case as was
Justice Stevens, or believes that it injects the Court into the political
process, as Brennan charged, there would be a future majority on the
Court to hold the case rather closely to its precise facts. It should be
noted, however, that the National League dissents, not its majority
opinion, set forth the liberal position. It seems likely, therefore, that
Justice O'Connor will not be pressing to limit the case.
A related case was Reeves v. Stake,60 also decided 5-4 with Stewart in
the majority. There the Court held that South Dakota, in a time of
emergency, could confine the sale of cement it produced solely to resi-
dents. When acting as a proprietor, said the majority, a state should be
free from the "implied negative" of the commerce clause in its dormant
state. This would leave regulatory policy up to Congress rather than to
the Court.6 Justices Powell, Brennan, White and Stevens, dissenting,
said that a state should be free from the commerce clause only when it
provides goods or services for the operations of government. If a state
is in the marketplace for other purposes, the Constitution prevents it
from impeding the flow of interstate commerce.62 The division on the
Court, it will be noted, is not completely along conservative or liberal
lines since although Justices Rehnquist and Burger were in the major-
ity, Powell dissented. Thus, it is more likely here than in some other
areas that Justice O'Connor might side with the dissenters and that fu-
ture cases may confine Reeves rather narrowly to its facts.
A good deal of attention has been given in the press and on TV to
how Justice O'Connor might vote in abortion cases. It is not likely that
her presence on the Court could change the basic holding of Roe v.
Wade63 that a woman has a constitutional privacy right to seek an
abortion during the first trimester.6' That result was reached by a
seven-to-two vote. Only Rehnquist and White complained that the
Court erred in protecting the convenience of the prospective mother
more that the continued expectancy of the life or potential life she car-
ries.65 As to whether it is constitutional to deny public funding for cer-
tain medically necessary abortions, however, Stewart was the fifth vote
as well as the author of the Court's opinion in Harris v. McRae66 which
59. Id. at 880-81.
60. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
61. Id. at 440-46.
62. Id. at 449-51.
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. Id. at 164.
65. Id. at 222.
66. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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held that such funding can constitutionally be denied.67 Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented vigorously.68 If Justice
O'Connor wanted to reconsider the Harris result, it seems likely that
she could get the necessary votes. It is not probable, however, that she
will frequently reach out to overturn precedent. During her confirma-
tion hearing she said that the judge's role is "one of interpreting and
applying law" and it is not "the function of the judiciary to step in and
change the law because times have changed or because cultural mores
have changed." 69
Another area where the Court has been riding close to a 5-4 edge is
affirmative action. Stewart interpreted federal legislation in the Bakke
case7° as not intended to allow consideration of race as a factor in em-
ployment. In Fullilove v. Klutznick,7" he said in dissent that affirmative
action denies equal protection because the Constitution is color blind.
Under our Constitution, he asserted, any official action that treats a
person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently
suspect and presumptively invalid.72 How Justice O'Connor ap-
proaches that question may make a real difference in whether the
Court approves state or federal programs of affirmative action.
Also in the equal protection area is Ambach v. Norwich. 73 There a 5-
4 Court recently held, over a liberal dissent (with Stewart in the major-
ity), that a state may refuse to employ aliens as school teachers when
they are eligible for U.S. citizenship but refuse to seek naturalization. 74
A similar judicial lineup held in La/li v. La/li75 that a state could refuse
inheritance rights to an illegitimate child whose father had not been
subjected to a judicial order of filiation during his lifetime.76 Justice
O'Connor could help hold these cases to their precise facts if she felt
somewhat more strongly about the rights of aliens and illegitimate chil-
dren than did Justice Stewart. Again, however, the conservative view
was expressed by the majority of these 5-4 cases, as it usually has been
in recent years.
In sum, then, if the assumption is made that Justice O'Connor will
more often than not align herself with conservative rather than liberal
positions, her presence on the Court will not change many of its deci-
67. Id. at 312-18.
68. Id. at 329.
69. Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1981, at 12, col. 2.
70. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
71. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
72. Id. at 523.
73. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
74. Id. at 80-81.
75. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
76. Id. at 271-74.
1982 / Justice O'Connor
sions. Of course, if Justice Brennan or Justice Marshall were to retire
during President Reagan's term and were succeeded by conservative
Justices, then a number of old doctrines might well be re-examined.
This re-examination might well be in accord with views of Justice
Rehnquist which now appear only in dissents that today may be con-
sidered extreme statements of conservatism, e.g., that Mapp v. Ohio77
should be overruled.78
77. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp held that evidence illegally obtained is not admissible in state
criminal proceedings. In Robbins v. California, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981), Justice Rehn-
quist, dissenting, repeated his call for overruling Mapp, saying that "[tihe harm caused by the
exclusionary rule is compounded by the judicially-created preference for a warrant as indicating
satisfaction of the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment." - U.S. at -, 101 S. Ct.
at 2852.
78. In her confirmation hearing, Justice O'Connor said that she has doubts about the exclu-
sionary rule. "'There are times when perfectly relevant evidence, and indeed sometimes the only
evidence in the case,' is excluded when it might be usable, 'if different standards were applied.'"
Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1981, at 12, col. 1. She continued, however, to say that, "'I don't want to be
interpreted as suggesting that I think it (the rule) is inappropriate when force or trickery or some
other reprehensible conduct has been used.'" Id.
Justice O'Connor's opinions, when on the bench of the Court of Appeals of Arizona, were
concise, clear, and well grounded in precedent. They do not, however, provide much insight into
how she would address specific constitutional issues. She most frequently faced problems of inter-
preting words or phrases in state statutes and determining whether or not the evidence sustained a
judgment below. Her opinions, spanning a period of about a year and a half, are as follows:
Fernandez v. United Acceptance Corp., 125 Ariz. App. 459, 610 P.2d 461 (1980) (when action
by a creditor is an invasion of privacy).
Cooper v. Arizona Western College, 125 Ariz. App. 463, 610 P.2d 465 (1980) (interpretation of
open meeting statute).
J.C. Penney Co. v. Arizona Dep't of Revenue, 125 Ariz. App. 469, 610 P.2d 471 (1980) (constitu-
tionality of Rental Occupancy Tax; entire excise tax structure examined to determine whether
classification was reasonable).
State v. Miguel, 125 Ariz. App. 538, 611 P.2d 125 (1980) (failure to empanel jury of proper size,
and the definition of robbery).
Andrews v. Andrews, 126 Ariz A pp. 55, 612 P.2d 511 (1980) (jurisdiction of a trial court in
postdissolution child support hearing).
O'Malley Lumber Co. v. Riley, 126 Ariz. App. 167, 613 P.2d 629 (1980) (interpretation of a loan
commitment).
Helena Chem. Co. v. Coury Bros. Ranches, 126 Ariz. App. 448, 616 P.2d 908 (1980) (error in
granting new trial when no error was fundamental).
Terry v. Lincscott Hotel Corp., 126 Ariz. App. 548, 617 P.2d 56 (1980) (interpretation of statute
requiring posting of notice by innkeeper to overcome common law liability; statute narrowly con-
strued so as not to change the common law beyond what was clearly intended).
Lewis v. Swenson, 126 Ariz. App. 561, 617 P.2d 69 (1980) (liability of attorney who asks ques-
tions of a witness at trial).
Sende Vista Water Co., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, -Ariz. App. -, 617 P.2d 1158 (1980) (eminent
domain and declaratory relief).
Thompson v. Arizona Dep't of Economic Security, - Ariz. App. -, 619 P.2d 1070 (1980)
(remand to determine whether wages were paid in an untimely manner).
Ott v. Samaritan Health Serv. - Ariz. App. -, 622 P.2d 44 (1980) (instructions in medical
malpractice action).
Nolden v. Industrial Comm'n, - Ariz. App. -, 622 P.2d 60 (1980) (worker's compensation).
Town of El Mirage v. Industrial Comm'n, - Ariz. App. -, 621 P.2d 286 (1980) (sufficiency of
evidence in workers' compensation case; was a lifeguard a seasonal employee).
Gardiner v. Arizona Dep't of Economic Security, - Ariz. App. -, 623 P.2d 33 (1980) (did
worker misconduct disqualify him for unemployment compensation).
Ryan v. Industrial Comm'n, - Ariz. App. -, 623 P.2d 37 (1981) (jurisdiction of Industrial
Commission over employment contracts formed in another state).
State v. Blevins, - Ariz. App. -, 623 P.2d 853 (1981) (vehicle manslaughter, sufficiency of
evidence).
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Magma Copper Co. v. Arizona Dep't of Economic Security, - Ariz. App. -, 625 P.2d 935
(1981) (did employer meet burden of proving that employee was discharged for misconduct).
State v. Morgan, - Ariz. App. -, 625 P.2d 951 (1981) (evidence and instruction questions
regarding conviction for assault with a deadly weapon).
Cote v. AJ. Bayless Markets, Inc., - Ariz. App. -, 626 P.2d 602 (1981) (breach of tenant's
covenant to repair and maintain premises).
Parkway Mfg. v. Industrial Comm'n, - Ariz. App.-, 626 P.2d 612 (1981) (review of evidence
in worker's disability case).
State v. Gessner, - Ariz. App. -, 626 P.2d 1119 (1981) (probation revocation; waiver of right
to appeal).
Owens v. Industrial Comm'n, - Ariz. App. -, 628 P.2d 962 (1981) (burden of proof that fear
of work was disabling).
Food Products Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, -Ariz. App.-, 630 P.2d 31 (1981) (did an injury
arise in the course of employment).
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, - Ariz. App. - 630 P.2d 56 (1981) (was contact
dermatitis a permanent impairment).
D.E.S. Youth Conservation Corps v. Industrial Comm'n, - Ariz. App. -, 630 P.2d 58 (1981)
(did a pocket knife injury relate to employment).
Pinnacle Park Developers v. TRW Inv. Corp., - Ariz. App. -, 631 P.2d 540 (1980) (promis-
sory fraud and the parol evidence rule in formal contracts between parties with some expertise
and sophistication; a scholarly review of conflicting opinions and a reasoned attempt to resolve the
problems).
